User Scanner
User Scanner: seguridad y operaciones para minimizar OSINT
Propósito, consentimiento, proxies, MCP, inteligencia infostealer, informes, secretos y respuesta.

Qué aprenderás
- Explain module, pivot, report, and MCP layers
- Run a bounded scan and interpret uncertainty
- Apply authorization, rate-limit, and data-retention controls
Antes de empezar
- Basic Git and command-line usage
- Comfort reading a project README
You can explain the project, run its documented first step, and decide what to verify before adopting it.
Conclusiones clave
- Purpose, authorization, minimization, retention, and review gate every scan.
- Protect proxy/MCP credentials and treat infostealer intelligence as highly sensitive.
- Agents summarize bounded evidence; they do not widen scope or infer identity automatically.
Define lawful purpose and minimization
Cada scan exige propósito, autorización, minimización, retención y revisor. Limita red, proxy, recursión y MCP; protege inteligencia Hudson Rock y prohíbe stalking, doxxing y recolección masiva sin base legal.
Never use the suite for stalking, doxxing, harassment, credential discovery, or bulk collection without a lawful basis. A public URL is not consent to aggregate or redistribute it.
Protect network and credentials
Use least-privilege accounts, allow-listed domains, bounded concurrency, timeouts, and explicit proxy policy. Keep proxy credentials, MCP configuration, and report paths out of source and logs. Do not treat TLS fingerprinting or rotation as a way around access controls or provider terms.
The Hudson Rock infostealer option is especially sensitive: restrict access, document legal basis, and never copy breach data into examples or unencrypted reports.
Harden MCP and agents
Expose `scan_username`, `scan_email`, and module discovery only to trusted clients. Validate target, category, module, depth, proxy, output, and loudness fields server-side; cap recursion and require approval for broad or sensitive scans.
Treat module responses and profile text as untrusted prompt content. An agent may summarize evidence but must not infer identity, contact a person, or launch a new scan without policy.
Respond and recover
Monitor unusual volume, errors, exposed secrets, report downloads, and data-retention violations. Stop the scanner, revoke credentials, quarantine reports, notify the owner or affected party when required, delete excess data, restore a known-good environment, and document the decision.
Cómo elegir
| Criterio | Opción A | Opción B |
|---|---|---|
| Best when | You need predictable behavior and easy auditing | You need adaptive optimization and have reliable telemetry |
| Main risk | May leave performance on the table | Can become difficult to explain or debug |
Pasos de implementación
- 1
Write purpose, authorization, target, fields, retention, and reviewer.
- 2
Restrict network, proxies, credentials, MCP, recursion, and outputs.
- 3
Redact/encrypt reports and monitor volume, errors, and data access.
- 4
Rehearse stop, revoke, quarantine, deletion, notification, and restore.
Ejemplo para copiar
purpose + authorization -> bounded target/modules
least privilege + allow-list -> redacted report
incident -> stop/revoke/quarantine/delete -> reviewPreguntas frecuentes
Can a positive username hit be published?
Only with a lawful basis, verification, minimization, and an appropriate disclosure process; a hit alone is not identity proof.
How should Hudson Rock results be handled?
Treat them as highly sensitive breach intelligence with strict access, retention, and legal review.
Fuentes
- User Scanner README (captured 2026-08-31)Fuente verificada 2026-08-31
- User Scanner repositoryFuente verificada 2026-08-31